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Chapter Six

Ghosts of Reconstruction
SAMUEL C. ARMSTRONG , BOOKER T . WASHINGTON , AND
THE DISCIPLINARY REGIMES OF JIM CROW COLONIALISM

We, who are a trifle progressive, are called "imperialists," because we are not going to allow
the poor Filipinos to vote. Probably we are not going to allow them to vote until we are satis
fied they can vote intelligently; but, just as certainly, when the time comes that the islanders
are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage they will get it. In all human probability they
will secure it sooner than some of the negro population in some of the Southern States.
Gentlemen of the South, gentlemen of Dixie--some of us imperialists do not blame you at
all for taking all possible legal measures to protect your cherished rights.Will you not forgive
us, if we pursue the same policy with regard to a new and untried race?
...The people [ of the Philippines] are intelligent and kindly and are imbued with repub
lican principles. To say that we want to enslave these people is a slander.To say that we shall
not improve their condition is to contradict history.
-CHARLES DENBY, "What Shall We Do with the Philippines?"
The effectiveness of disfranchisement is suggested by a comparison of the number of reg
istered Negro voters in Louisiana in 1896, when there were 130,334, and in 1904, when there
were 1,342.
-C. VANN WOODWARD,StrangeCareer ofJim Crow
"Be sure not to forget what your grace promised me about the insula; I'll know how to govern
it no matter how big it is."
-MIGUEL DE CERVANT ES ,Don Quixote

Southerners were among the U.S. citizens advocating expansion into the
Caribbean, Mexico, and other areas, and they also played a central role both
before and after the Civil War in the debates about whether an American empire
was an inevitable expression of-or a threat to-a healthy democracy. Before the
war many southerners envisioned making new slave states of territories such as
Cuba to help displace northern dominance in Congress. The so-called Young
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Americans group of the 1840s united a younger generation's banking, mercantile,
railroad, and political interests, including Stephen A. Douglas of ILiinois, George
N. Sanders of Kentucky, and Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana, with visions of
Cuban sugar marketed throughout the United States and U.S. wheat, pork, and
other products finding a ready market south of the border. Long before 1898,
U.S.-based partisans tried to overthrow Spanish rule in the Caribbean, such as
Narciso Lopez's three invasions of Cuba between 1849 and 1851 aided by Mexican
war veterans, Sanders, and one Jefferson Davis.1
After 1865, U.S. expansion into the Caribbean proved a potent temptation for
figures who held widely differing views over the Civil War and Reconstruction.
J. D. B. De Bow enthusiastically promoted a U.S. tropical empire in the Caribbean,
hoping his adopted city of New Orleans would play a major role in this imagined
source of growth for a postbellum South, while many Radical Reconstructionists,
especially Charles Sumner, vehemently opposed U.S. expansion in the Caribbean
on the grounds that it suppressed black rights for nationhood. Frederick
Douglass, however, broke with Sumner and allied with Ulysses S. Grant over the
issue. Douglass argued, "When the slave power bore rule, and a spirit of injus
tice and oppression animated and controlled every part of our government,
I was for limiting our dominion to the smallest possible margin; but since liberty
and equality have become the law of our land, I am for extending our dominion
whenever and wherever such extension can peaceably and honorably, and with
the approval and desire of all the parties concerned, be accomplished" (Life and
Times 417). Douglass tried carefully to qualify this 1881 statement regarding the
United States' right of "dominion": "To me [annexation] meant the alliance of
a weak and defenceless people, having few or none of the attributes of a nation,
torn and rent by internal feuds, unable to maintain order at home, or command
respect abroad, to a government which would give it peace, stability, prosperity,
and civilization, and make it helpful to both countries. To favor annexation at the
time when Santo Domingo asked for a place in our union, was a very different
thing from what it was when Cuba and Central America were sought by filibus
tering expeditions" (Life and Times 416-417).
Douglass hoped that Santo Domingo might eventually become the first U.S
state with a majority black population. Later in Life and Times, when Douglass
denounces the collapse of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, he consider
ably complicates his portrait of the postwar U.S. as a dominion bringing free
dom. Analyzing the causes of the betrayal of Reconstruction in the U.S. South,
Douglass's language shifts and sounds positively anti-colonial. For U.S. south
ern rather than Caribbean blacks, dreams of citizenship have been betrayed by
"strangers, foreigners, invaders, trespassers, aliens, and enemies" (513). Given the
era's events, it is hardly surprising that Douglass had trouble acknowledging,
much less solving, this contradiction in his life and times.
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U.S. dominion in the Caribbean proved so attractive a possibility after the
Civil War that it brought under its sway not just Douglass but white southern
ers who had been firmly against both abolition and Reconstruction. Indeed, as
the historian Moon-ho Jung has shown, Chinese laborers were imported to work
the sugarcane fields of Louisiana following Caribbean plantation models; it was
felt that the Chinese racial mixture of docility and industry would serve as a
competitive role model to blacks, whose work ethic whites believed would other
wise degenerate in freedom. With the rise of the New South in the late 1870s and
the 1880s, it is true that many southerners strongly opposed U.S. expansionism
for racist reasons, arguing that the last thing the body politic needed was respon
sibility for even more "colored" dependents. But key southerners before and
after the heady victories of 1898 supported further links between the U.S. South
and the Caribbean and the South Pacific, in part because they felt the southern
economy, especially cane and cotton growers and mill owners, would directly
benefit.
As colonial trade and cultural uplift became central elements of Progressivism
at the turn to the twentieth century, public discourses advocating democratic
rights and economic development in nascent colonial republics protected by U.S.
power clashed with policy-makers' determination to control the economies and
politics of the newly owned territories. Theodore Roosevelt shaped a new under
standing of the Monroe Doctrine so that it now meant that the United States
had a right to ensure that European colonial rivals did not use debt problems or
trade monopolies to gain undue influence over any country in the hemisphere
or the Philippines. He also generally agreed with white southerners that the
mistake made during Reconstruction was giving blacks voting rights too soon.
Progressivist arguments for expansion quickly found support from Republicans
like President McKinley, independents like Roosevelt, and key southern
Democrats. It was a southern Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, after all, whose presi
dency simultaneously instituted Jim Crow segregation as standard government
procedure in the nation's capital while vigorously extending U.S. colonial
domination abroad. Wilson continued support of a U.S.-friendly Nicaraguan
government set up in 1911; made Haiti a protectorate in 1915; and directed the
invasion and military rule of the Dominican Republic in 1916 and Cuba in 1917,
among other events. By 1920 the United States had 120,000 troops stationed in
eight overseas territories (Heffernan 119). These interventions were justified as
strategic self-interest, but also invoked were arguments stressing altruism
the white man's burden to export democracy and modernity to barbaric
peoples.2
White supremacism in this era was as explosive as dynamite, Alfred
Nobel's recent invention; it did not necessarily bond easily with arguments for
empire that conceded empire might be difficult and white rule would not go
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unchallenged. Kipling's poem that made famous the phrase "the White Man's
burden;' after all, was as much a warning as it was a challenge. But it did memo
rably suggest that the United States would never enter adult maturity as a nation
unless it realized its destiny as an imperial power: "Take up the White Man's bur
den/Have done with childish days." Promoters of U.S. expansionism had to work
mightily to prove that acquiring colonies would be beneficial to whites both at
home and abroad, and would allow the United States to compete successfully
with European empires across the globe. T hey also had to demonstrate that any
changes instituted in the new colonies in the name of modernization would give
people of color limited political and economic rights but not threaten the status
of whites in charge.
In striking such a delicate balance in U.S. imperial discourse, the exam
ple of the New South played an absolutely crucial role. In the post-1898 period,
Reconstruction was frequently invoked as both a key precedent and cautionary
tale for the new colonialism. If Reconstruction was so roundly rejected by so
many by 1877, how can we explain this curious afterlife? Beginning in the 1890s,
after the rise of the New South, there was a huge surge of new studies of the post
war period published by academic historians. What connections might we find
between these new revisionary histories of Reconstruction and the contemporary
debates over expansionism abroad? Another large question: How can we explain
that just as the limited civil rights legislated for blacks during Reconstruction
were being curtailed in the 1880s and 1890s, U.S. expansion abroad was justified
in part because it would bring democratic rights to oppressed peoples abroad?
Was this contradiction merely an example of hypocrisy, a dissonance that went
willfully ignored? Or did pro-expansion Progressivists try to explain such anom
alies by claiming that peoples of color at home and abroad were not denied
civil rights, but rather were being tutored how to gain such rights and enter
modernity?
Critiquing how the white man's burden was understood in the United States,
we must understand that the creation of citizens-as-subjects also involves the
subjection of people of color, the attempt firmly to delineate limits within which
they may exercise their newly created political and economic power. To compre
hend such a paradox in action we must think historically, which means returning
to the history of Reconstruction, the first self-consciously national program in
the United States designed to construct new citizens of color fit for democracy.
As we do so, we may want to remember that John Philip Sousa moved without
missing a beat from composing the "King Cotton" march for the Cotton States
Exposition in Atlanta in 1895 to writing "El Capitan" -which, after its Broadway
debut in 1896 in a comic operetta satirizing Spanish colonial rule, became so pop
ular it was played on board Admiral George Dewey's flagship as it steamed into
Manila Bay in the Philippines in 1898..3
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1
When C. Vann Woodward in 1951, in the midst of the Cold War, linked the dis
franchisement of black voters throughout the South to U.S. colonial policies in the
tropics, his analysis was as correct as it was daring. But it was also perhaps too
narrow, lacking the emphasis on irony for which Origins of the New South justly
became famous. Woodward's claim of a link between disfranchisement and colo
nialism also had a contradiction at its heart that has not been analyzed closely
enough.
Woodward suggested that the "Second Mississippi Plan" for un-register
ing black voters gained notice throughout the South in the 1890s after the
scare of Populism, but that it was only after Booker T. Washington's ''Atlanta
Compromise" speech of 1895 and the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
Second Mississippi Plan in 1898 that the majority of ex-Confederate states, plus
Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, followed suit (321-323). "In the meantime;'
Woodward pointed out, "the North had taken up the White Man's Burden, and
by 1898 was looking to Southern racial policy for national guidance in the new
problems of imperialism resulting from the Spanish war" (324). Here Woodward
implied that southern practices restricting black voting had become a uni
fied "policy" by 1898 and only after that date were adopted as a model for U.S.
colonial rule.
Yet elsewhere Woodward stated that in some cases the southern states' new
suffrage restrictions used emerging U.S. colonial policy in Hawaii as a model, not
just Mississippi. T he relevant passage is worth extended quotation:

Commenting on the Supreme Court's opinion upholding disfranchise
ment in Mississippi, the Nation pronounced it "an interesting coincidence
that this important decision is rendered at a time when we are consider
ing the idea of taking in a varied assortment of inferior races in differ
ent parts of the world" -races "which, of course, could not be allowed
to vote." Senator Morgan of Alabama was chairman of the committee of
the Hawaiian Commission that framed the voting restrictions for one
"assortment of inferior races." To reject the property and literacy tests rec
ommended for Hawaiians, reported the Senator, would be to "turn the leg
islature over to the masses" and "deprive the more conservative elements
and property owners of effective representation:' Senator Morgan's advice
was also sought by the white-supremacy advocates of his own state who
were currently debating additional franchise restrictions for Alabama.
A speech in defense of American imperialism by George F. Hoar "most amply
vindicated the South;' said Senator John L. McLaurin of South Carolina.
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He thanked the Massachusetts statesman "for his complete announcement
of the divine right of the Caucasian to govern the inferior races." The
Boston Evening Transcript reluctantly admitted that the Southern way was
"now the policy of the Administration of the very party which carried the
country into and through a civil war to free the slave."
Events in the Philippines soon indicated that the Mississippi Plan had
become the American Way. ( Origins of the New South 324-325)
In other words, before the Mississippi Plan to control voters of color spread
throughout the South, it was first reconceived as a valid national or American
plan. For this to occur, the Mississippi Plan was field-tested, so to speak, in a new
U.S. colony abroad. Versions of Mississippi's tactics may well have been adopted
by the entire South without the acquisition of Hawaii or a war with Spain: several
cities in Tennessee, for example, had experimented with a plan to reduce voter
rolls in the 1880s. But many voting districts in the South still had large numbers
of black voters as late as 1898, and the sudden acquisition of overseas colonies
and national debates about limited suffrage in the colonies transformed how Jim
Crow disfranchisement tactics were understood and justified.4
Given the ambiguity about the Mississippi Plan's origins in Woodward's
Origins, perhaps we should briefly revisit the issue of suffrage in the colonies
and not focus so exclusively, as Woodward does, on instances of North/South
agreement on black disfranchisement. Instead of using a narrative that assumes
policies regarding voting rights were internally coherent and worked out in
one domain before applied to another, I want to explore whether new "domes
tic" and "colonial" policies regarding citizens' rights were mutually constitutive,
emerging together in the crucial period of the late 1890s. What precedents and
arguments were used to validate Mississippi-style tests for voters? What does it
mean that public forms of racial segregation were adopted for newly occupied
colonial cities such as Manila or Havana before they were instituted throughout
the South? When we investigate answers to such questions, we notice immedi
ately that whites' experiences during Reconstruction were repeatedly invoked to
justify these developments, bolstered by quotations about the white man's bur
den and the clash of civilizations. We also will quickly notice that U.S. colonial
policies-especially regarding education and voting rights-were not homoge
neous or internally consistent from colony to colony. In part this was because the
policies developed incrementally. But we may also understand that the internal
contradictions in imperial policies and discourses are similar to those in both
Reconstruction and the post-1877 New South-the nation's first and second
large-scale programs for regime change and citizen making.
A complex Progressivist narrative of discipline and uplift, not outright
exclusion, was used to justify the white man's burden toward people of color at
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home and abroad. For this reason, I suggest the term "Jim Crow colonialism" as
being most appropriate for these and related policies. Highly paternal, Jim Crow
colonial policies stressed the strategic use of both violence and other forms of
punishment and narratives of patient nurturing that presented U.S. goals as
being altruistic and innocent as well as pragmatic. But by making racial segre
gation a key practice of U.S. colonial policy, a new dimension was introduced:
Jim Crow effectively became national policy after 1898, not merely regional and
southern. Further, this new, more explicitly codified form of segregation in pub
lic places was understood as just one element in the United States' plans for the
proper uplift and development of backward peoples. Just as their economic,
educational, and political systems would be hauled into the modern era, so too
would their race relations. Jim Crow colonialism, in short, was a key constituent
of Progressivism.5
Recently a number of scholars, most notably Amy Kaplan, have stressed the
ways in which the United States' new imperial discourses positioned the new
colonies in a liminal space that was both "belonging to" and "not a part of" the
U.S. proper. Reading the Supreme Court decisions now known as the Insular
Cases, Kaplan unpacks the paradoxes involved when discourses of the "domes
tic" and the "nation" are dependent upon their antitheses: the justices "repeat
edly conjured an image of Puerto Rico as a 'disembodied shade' that lurked
around the edges of the embodied nation" (Anarchy of Empire 5). I will take a
complementary approach here, stressing the ways in which both the New South
and the new colonies were seen as necessary correctives to the failed program of
Reconstruction that nevertheless retained many of Reconstruction's large ambi
tions. In my approach the stress is not so much on liminality as it is on cen
trality. For Jim Crow colonialists, Reconstruction's attempts to build a modern
democratic citizenry and economic infrastructures would be repeated both
in the South and abroad-but this time the United States would get it right.
Progressivist social policies-especially those involving political rights and edu
cation reforms-applied models of development to both the South and the
colonies, assuming close parallels, not fundamental differences, between the
future of the re-annexed South and that of the newly acquired tropical colonies.
Yet just as federal Reconstruction was not a single government policy and was
full of contradictions-as historians such as Woodward, John Hope Franklin,
Eric Foner, and Saidiya Hartman have shown-so too U.S. colonial policies
in the 1890s and beyond were defined not by a single discourse but by a set of
competing narratives that proved impossible to synthesize. No matter how
disparate, however, such narratives did find one point of agreement: the postwar
U.S. South provided both models and cautionary tales for U.S. colonial
development.6
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2
One representative example of how contemporary debate linked New South
and colonial development is Charles Denby's article "What Shall We Do with
the Philippines?" excerpted as an epigraph for this chapter. It appeared in 1899
in the Forum, a major public policy journal of the Progressive era. Alluding to
the vigorous anti-imperialist debates of the time, Denby downplays their argu
ments that the conquered lands deserved independence, not U.S. supervision.
He invoked white rule in the United States after Reconstruction as a valuable
precedent and then, revealingly, focused on both Jim Crow and U.S. colonial
ism as policies of improved Reconstruction-policies that fixed Reconstruction's
excesses and, this time, gave a properly controlled education in self-government
to peoples who had suffered enslavement and cultural impoverishment. The
U.S. South's "peculiar institution" and Spanish colonial rule were cast as similar
villains (both caused broad cultural degeneration, though they partially "civi
lized" Africans). With the overthrow of slavery and colonialism both territories
were seen by Denby as being liberated into the light of modernity and progress.
Denby, it should be added, also qualified his vision of the supervised progress of
the colored races in an important way, suggesting that because blacks were the
most inferior race their rate of advance might be slowest.7
To examine further the ways in which late nineteenth-century U.S. racial dis
course, including colonialism, legitimized itself via allusions to Reconstruction
and the post-1877 South, let us turn to John W. Burgess's Reconstruction and the
Constitution (1902). A leading public intellectual of the time, Burgess had two
goals in publishing Reconstruction: to validate the New South's revisionary his
tory of Reconstruction, and to invoke this corrected and modified version of
Reconstruction, now embodied in the New South, as a precedent for U.S. global
power. The praiseworthy aim of Reconstruction, in Burgess's words, was "to secure
the civil rights of the newly emancipated race, and to re-establish loyal Common
wealths in the South" (vii). "Two ways were open for the attainment of the end
sought": the first was to place "political power in the hands of the newly emanci
pated"; the second Burgess termed "the nationalization of civil liberty by placing it
under the protection of the Constitution and the national Judiciary, and holding
the districts of the South under Territorial civil government until the white race
in those districts should have sufficiently recovered from its temporary disloy
alty to the Union to be intrusted again with the powers of Commonwealth local
government" (vii-viii). In Burgess's view, Reconstruction made the disastrous
first choice, giving too much power to the newly emancipated, while the New
South proved the wisdom of the alternative. Note how in Burgess's description of
what that proper alternative is in the quotation above, he glides in mid-sentence
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from stressing the importance of a strong federal government to lauding the
return of white rule.
Burgess believed Reconstruction was the most significant transformation of
federal power in U.S. history, after the 1787 Constitution itself. He argued that this
new power had been tragically misapplied, in effect colonizing white southerners,
but that the new federal power assumed during Reconstruction was not in itself
malicious. In fact, it would prove absolutely necessary in the postwar global era
where strong nations must undertake "imperial enterprises." The United States
is learning "every day by valuable experiences that there are vast differences in
political capacity between the races, and that it is the white man's mission, his
duty and his right, to hold the reins of political power in his own hands for the
civilization of the world and the welfare of mankind" (viii-ix). Reconstruction
as corrected by white southern rule, then, was a rehearsal for new empire, an
example of military rule yielding to a political order installing carefully delimited
democracy. Burgess did have later reservations about the compatibility of democ
racy with empire, most notably developed in his study, The Reconciliation of
Government with Liberty (1915). But others did not, including Burgess's colleague
at Columbia, the sociologist Franklin Giddings, and a professor at Princeton
named Woodrow Wilson.
In a 1901 article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled "The Reconstruction of the
Southern States," Wilson repeated the by then conventional analysis of the "dark
chapter" of black rule but, like Burgess, found a positive element too: federal
Reconstruction was the first imperfect expression of a new national consciousness
in the postwar nation. For Wilson the reunion of North and South unleashed
feelings of new patriotism that inevitably expressed themselves in expansion
abroad: "Undoubtedly, the impulse of expansion is the natural and wholesome
impulse which comes with a consciousness of matured strength; but it is also a
direct result of that national spirit which the war between the states cried so wide
awake, and to which the processes of Reconstruction gave the subtle assurance of
practically unimpeded sway and a free choice of means." 8
Franklin Giddings's Democracy and Empire (1900) assumed that the final stage
in the evolution of democracy was expansion and a new form of empire: not the
conquest of territory but benevolent dominion over less developed states as they
are tutored to make as much of a transition as they are capable of doing from still
feudal postcolonial states to modern democracies. He recognized that for a con
stitutional democracy, difficult polity and ethics issues were involved in governing
any colonies it acquired. Pro-imperialists had some difficulty explaining colonial
resistance to U.S. rule, particularly in the Philippines, where U.S. troops' bloody
battles with an insurgent army fighting for independence received much coverage
in U.S. newspapers. Was it right to educate an unwilling people in U.S.-sanctioned
democracy without their consent? A particularly revealing chapter is Giddings's
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"The Consent of the Governed." "Consent is more than submission," Giddings
stated; "it implies that the consenting person, with full apprehension of the facts,
has agreed to a certain conclusion or policy, through an act of his individual
reason" (259). But such rational, informed consent was hardly possible, at present,
for the population of the Philippines: "if a barbarian people is compelled to accept
the authority of a state more advanced in civilization, the test of rightfulness ... is
to be found not at all in any assent or resistance at the moment when the govern
ment begins, but only in the degree ofprobability that, after full experience of what
the government can do to raise the subject population to a higher plane of life,
a free and rational consent will be given by those who can come to understand all
that has been done" (265, Giddings's italics).
Masquerading as rational, with deep concern for the free interaction of autono
mous subjects, Giddings's rhetoric is, of course, circular doublespeak and demon
strates the opposite of what it claims.Filipinos in the above scenario can claim their
rights as citizens rather than subjects only by ceding the definition of those rights
to the United States.Their rights at present are thus alienable, not inalienable, and
"free" consent can only be given at an unnamed future date, "after full experience"
of the U.S. colonial experiment in disciplinary democracy. Giddings's rationale for
the white man's burden was echoed by many, including Woodrow Wilson, who,
when lecturing at Columbia in 1907, said in reference to the Philippines, " Self
government ...is a form of character.It follows upon the long discipline which gives
a people self-possession, self-mastery, the habit of order and peace.... No people
can be 'given' the self-control of maturity.Only a long apprenticeship of obedience
can secure them the precious possession" ( Constitutional Government 52-53).9
Giddings's and Wilson's disquisitions on how to interpret the Declaration of
Independence's phrase "the consent of the governed" have an intriguing prehistory,
for to create their arguments they drew not just on the history of Western politi
cal philosophy but also on Senate debates and cartoons about the new colonies
appearing in the popular press. The idea that the "consent of the governed" really
meant "the consent of some of the governed" was famously Senator Orville Platt's.
Against senators who argued that constitutional rights applied to the territories,
Platt in 1898 sharply distinguished between the rights of inhabitants of states and
those in territories; he claimed the latter were governed by the laws of Congress
but not the Constitution: "Where is the limitation in the Constitution on the
right to acquire? Where is it said in the Constitution that the territory acquired by
conquest must be held by the United States for the purpose of admitting States?"
Citing various Supreme Court justices, including Chief Justice Bradley, the author
of the majority opinion in the "Civil Rights" cases of 1883 that were a crucial step
in the Supreme Court's destruction of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
Platt stressed Congress's absolute authority; it may not only abrogate laws of the
territorial legislatures, but it may itself legislate directly for local governments.
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Replying to Senator Hoar's question whether "governments derive their just pow
ers from the consent of the governed;' Platt answered, "from the consent of some
of the governed." Platt then made his key point: "I admit that whenever we stipu
late in the acquisition of territory with the country from which we acquire it that
we will admit it as a State or States into the Union, we are in honor bound, in the
performance of that contract, to do everything we can in a preliminary way to fit
that Territory and its people for admission as a State. But when that clause is want
ing in the treaty [as with Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines],
I deny that there is any constitutional or moral obligation to fit the Territory for
statehood." Such reasoning nevertheless asserted Congress's legislative author
ity over the new colonies, just as it had ultimate authority over territories in the
West that were not yet ready for statehood, and just as it had exercised legislative
dominion over the southern states after Reconstruction until they were ready to
be re-admitted to the Union with rights equal to those of the other states. Platt's
suggestion that the white man's burden was in part a pedagogical one was quickly
picked up in the popular press, as the Louis Dalrymple cartoon "School Begins"
(illustrated and discussed in the introduction) cogently demonstrates. Dalrymple's
graphic was especially shrewd in its linkage of federal colonial policies of depend
ency with Reconstruction, where the southern states were governed "without their
consent until they [could] govern themselves."10
If southern whites proved capable of joining (or rejoining) the "some of the
governed" who properly understood the responsibilities of self-governance, others
were thought to be less capable. Consider the wording of the 1898 Supreme Court
decision validating the Mississippi Plan: "Under section 244, it is left with the
administrative officer to determine whether the applicant reads, understands,
or interprets the section of the constitution designated" ( Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213). The Court claimed such tests were racially neutral because some
whites took them as well as blacks. Its legal discourse stressed neither exclusion
nor coercion toward those who failed, but rather a gradual and sometimes pain
ful education in their future constitutional rights. The Fifteenth Amendment,
however, could not have been more plain: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Progressivist
racial discourse in the 1890s adeptly translated the "privileges and immunities"
guaranteed citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to vote guaran
teed by the Fifteenth Amendment into rights that could be managed by racial

superiors until the distant future moment when they could be understood and
claimed. Rights evolved and had to be earned and understood through proper
education and disciplining; they were not inborn. Hence they were not being
"denied or abridged" by Williams v. Mississippi, according to the Court; they
were only being nurtured under beneficent but firm rule. Like "culture" itself,
114

Samuel C. Armstrong, Booker T. Washington, and the Disdplinary Regimes

Fig. 6.1. "[Made Anglo-Saxon] By Act of
Congress"

in fact, civil rights in the Progressive era could either progress or degenerate and
be lost.
The Progressive era's stance toward blacks treating them as schoolchildren
being tutored in democracy had its most immediate precursor in Reconstruction's
massive plans to help blacks make the transition from ex-slaves to citizens.
But Reconstruction's discourse of uplift and disciplinary tutelage, of course, has
an earlier history as well; in the first half of the nineteenth century, similar assump
tions were articulated to justify official U.S. policy toward Indians. The most famous
instance is Justice John C. Marshall's argument in Cherokee Nation v. The State
of Georgia (1831) describing the Cherokees being displaced from Georgia to the
Oklahoma Territories as "domestic dependent nations" in a "state of pupilage."
Despite clear differences in the circumstances Indian nations and ex-slaves found
themselves in relation to the United States government, especially its military
and legal systems, in the nineteenth century, Marshall's concept of a people as a
"ward" with the state as "guardian" (Prucha 59) proved fungible after 1898, particu
larly with both the Williams v. Mississippi Supreme Court decision and emergent
U.S. colonial polity.
Given the perceived failures of Reconstruction, there was an obvious tension
in Jim Crow colonialist rhetoric between teaching citizenship and maintaining
subjection. Fears that blacks (or colored colonials) would "misunderstand" the
privileges conferred by the Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution
as applying to the present, not the future, found their way into contemporary
115

Jim Crow Colonialism's Dependency Model for "Uplift": Promotion and Reaction

humor, such as the cartoon (see fig. 6.1) in Puck, 7 September 1898, a New York
satiric journal that also frequently indulged its readers' taste for minstrel-style
portraits of blacks in the New South in the context of pro-imperial rhetoric.
The cartoon's caption reads:
By Act of Congress.
Mr. Johnson - I'se in favor ob de Anglo-Saxon alliance eb'ry time!
Mr. Black - G'wan! Yo' ain't no Anglo-Saxon.
Mr. Johnson - Cou'se I is! We's all Anglo-Saxons sence de Fifteent' 'Mendment
wuz passed.

3
John Carlos Rowe, Oscar Campomanes, and others have persuasively argued
that U.S. expansionism has a long history of justifying itself as anti-colonial or
anti-imperial. 11 Allegedly, it builds independent republics, never colonies, by
tutoring territories under its sovereignty to enter modernity. Such claims were
very common at the turn to the twentieth century in particular, when debate
over what having an "empire" would do to the United States as a democracy was
vociferous. Like many expansionist movements before it, Progressivism asserted
that the United States would be "exceptional" and exempt from the decline of
past civilizations if the new U.S. power formations corrected the errors of pre
vious empires and ruled by trade and education and "influence," not coercion.
In addition, one of Progressivism's distinctive contributions to the U.S. discourse
of imperialism was to follow Frederick Douglass's lead and synthesize the most
powerful reformist rhetoric of the antebellum United States-that of abolition
ism-to the late Victorian discourses of evolution and progress. It was a powerful
mix. Here is Theodore Roosevelt in 1901: "It is our duty toward the people living
in barbarism to see that they are freed from their chains."12
Roosevelt's recycled abolitionist rhetoric was hardly unusual. Kristin Hoganson
has explained why even before 1898 many white Americans supported mixed
race Cubans against Spain: U.S. newspapers cast the struggle for independ
ence as an adventure-filled chivalric romance, temporarily overriding negative
racial stereotypes (45). After 1898, though, Americans saw themselves, not the
Cubans, as the heroic knights. The 1898 photograph on the cover of Nina Silber's
The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865-1900, shows a Rebel
and a Union officer clasping hands in front of a young girl representing Cuba,
whom they have united to liberate. In a classic pose adopted from antebellum
abolitionist iconography, the ex-captive raises high an arm holding her broken
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chains. If abolitionism focused on liberating blacks, the new imperial rhetoric
of the 1890s claimed to liberate peoples of all colors from their benighted cul
tural imprisonment. But the new colonialism was arguably also intent on lib
erating whiteness. It is no coincidence that the "Cuban" girl in Silber's cover
photograph is blonde, or that countless new imperialists, most notably Rudyard
Kipling and Theodore Roosevelt, stressed how colonial activism re-energized and
matured white males. The imperial trope of reinvigorated whiteness had long
been a staple of colonialist/settler discourse, most notably in the captivity narra
tives that were best-sellers in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But
Progressivism's innovation at the end of the nineteenth century was to redefine
the melodrama of white identity under siege. Anti-Reconstruction literature of
the white South had portrayed white southerners enslaved by savages, victims of
a demonic reversal of proper colonialism who were emancipated only by the rise
of the white-rule "Redeemers" of the New South. At their most melodramatic, the
new Progressivist arguments for expansionism abroad also exploited white rescue
narratives in order to spike popular support. In this way, Progressivist imperial
ism under Roosevelt and others stripped away the careful qualifications Frederick
Douglass had attempted to apply to his arguments for the United States' right of
dominion abroad. Unlike Douglass, the United States no more dreamed of allow
ing independent states ruled by people of color in its territories abroad than it
had allowed blacks to keep power long in the former Confederate states. The
alleged fiasco of black rule during Reconstruction made such new colonial poli
cies appear rational and prudent, even as they were also cast as inheriting all the
moral righteousness of the anti-slavery movement. Revising Reconstruction his
tory, Dunning, Giddings, and their followers made a powerful case for limiting
suffrage in the colonies and closing down the questions of whether colonial sub
jects could vote in U.S. national elections, or whether colonies could eventually
become states.
As the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
rearticulated itself as the vigorous new scion of a centuries-long tradition of
Anglo-Saxon civilization-building, a crisis in the very definition of race became
unavoidable-not just among race theorists in biology and anthropology, but
also in U.S. political and literary discourse. By the turn of the century, contra
dictions and inconsistencies mounted in studies attempting to define racial dif
ference in physical terms. "Scientific" works attempting to ground race in skull,
hair, skin, and even fingerprint differences had not disappeared, but increasingly
after 1880 they had to compete for authority with studies arguing that the pri
mary differences among the races were matters of character and culture, history
and learning ability. Many Progressivists accepted the new scientific skepticism
regarding efforts to define race in terms of quantifiable biological difference
(blood, skull shape, etc.), in favor of an emphasis on group differences defined
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in part by blood but mostly by acculturation-by "character" shaped by a group's
cultural history. As Walter Benn Michaels has helped us understand, such "race
into-culture" discourses hardly resolved the issue of whether allegedly "racial"
characteristics were innate or learned. But they did assume that individual and
group character were not fixed but could develop and mature-within certain
limits-or degenerate. One example is the anthropologist Franz Boas's Changes
in Bodily Form of Descendents of Immigrants (1912), a study funded by the U.S.
Immigration Commission. Boas debunked racial phenotypes as a reliable system
of classification, in part because "bodily form" did not remain stable from one
generation to the next, particularly with intermixture of racial and ethnic types
in the United States. Instead, Boas promoted anthropometric studies of culture
and behavioral traits. Although many of his contemporaries hardly agreed that
"race" was an illusion, much less were accepting of his thesis that U.S. history
charted the gradual amalgamation of Indian, Negro, and white, Boas's emphasis
on observable "character" being more reliable than visual signifiers was widely
shared well before 1912. Such shifts in the meanings of "racial" difference had a
pronounced impact on U.S. Progressivist policies both at home and abroad
especially those foregrounding the importance of education.
"Character" in the late nineteenth-century context, as Cathy Boeckmann has dem
onstrated, meant the ability to govern one's immediate desires in order to achieve
long-term goals. One racial group--Anglo-Saxons-allegedly had an abundance
of this talent for deferred gratification, and only this group was thus fit to rule over
others for their own good or to incapacitate them by competition. In moving racial
difference even partially and incompletely away from visual signs that could be read
toward a set of interior characteristics that were learned and then performed, how
ever, such discourses made whiteness rather unstable. Whiteness became not a firm
racial essence but a characteristic that could be lost if performed poorly or stolen and
worn as a mask. It was no longer a status biologically guaranteed, but a heritage, a
quality of behavior, and a set of rights that could be betrayed or learned.13
Furthermore, by tying racial difference more closely to character than it had
ever been, Progressivist race discourse linked it to the development and mod
ernization of a nation managed by enlightened white rule. For if race defined
an individual's and a group's potential, then racial identity could be properly or
improperly nurtured by one's environment. Whites were assumed to be supe
rior, but they could only be properly trained to their role by a modern racial state
governed in their interest. However we define it, Progressivism was replete with
paradox. One way to think of Progressivism was as a discourse of social engineer
ing helping different groups progress at different rates determined by their inner
destiny. But by the late nineteenth century, the fate of racial identity paralleled
that of rights: neither was inalienable; like character, they had continuously to be
performed and claimed.
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Nancy Cohen's recent study of Progressivism and its precursors has added
important nuances to our understanding of the contradictions in the "free labor"
ideology that undergirded both abolitionism and Reconstruction. As both Eric
Foner and Saidiya Hartman have shown, free labor ideology stressed how only
wage labor could create the self-discipline necessary for responsible citizen
ship. In ''A Civilizer's Errand: Southern Man, the Politics of Free Labor, and the
'Race Question"' in The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1914, Cohen
asks why many white northern supporters of Reconstruction during the crucial
1865-68 period favored free labor contracts for the freemen, but not land redistri
bution. Her answer: the northerners' free labor ideology claimed that saving one's
wages from fairly negotiated labor contracts would best educate former slaves
in the responsibilities of citizenry, not gifts of confiscated land. The majority of
white supporters of Reconstruction never campaigned openly to prevent many
confiscated southern farms and plantations from being returned to their orig
inal owners or other white claimants. Further, Cohen rightly stresses that such
attitudes were classically colonialist: the "colonialist character of the Northern
project reached its most refined development among Radicals who opposed land
redistribution. Economic transformation, accomplished through political and
military domination, would remake the people of the South, and civilization
would thus be implanted in the dark corner of the nation" (65). 14
By the 1870s, as northern support for Reconstruction waned, northern liberals
and New South Democrats came to agree that it had been a disastrous mistake
to give freedmen suffrage. They also agreed that it was nai:ve to believe contract
labor would quickly erase the bad habits of slavery. Summarizing the arguments
in James S. Pike's The Prostrate State (1874) and Charles Nordhoff's The Cotton
States in the Spring and Summer of 1875 (1876), two important texts legitimating
the northern retreat on Reconstruction, Cohen says, "Pike and Nordhoff agreed
that a long apprenticeship as agricultural laborers would do the best good for
the free person's chance at evolution. Both waffled, however, on whether the old
Southern planters or a new breed of superior Northerners would make the best
trustees. This ambiguity marked the contradiction of forging a colonial model of
development for a region within the territory of a liberal nation-state" (83-84).
Over the next decade and more, the New South's solution to that contradiction
consisted in having it both ways-further encouraging northern capital's pre
sence in the South while simultaneously stressing southern independence and a
supposedly modernized plantation staple-crop economy employing labor that
euphemistically was said to be "share-cropping."
Cohen did not consider the question of how central such discourses of disci
plinary reform were to Progressivist colonial policies abroad. In the new colonies,
what would the new schools for democracy teach? How would the teachers be
taught? It is time now to examine briefly new discoveries by historians concerning
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the most influential example in the New South and Progressivist periods of
constructing an "education in modernity " for people of color-the Hampton/
Tuskegee "industrial education" model. Here too we will find New South and
colonial histories inextricably convolved-and both haunted by Reconstruction's
earlier, more ambitious dreams of school and citizen building.

4
Consider first some startling facts. Booker T. Washington's Hawaiian-born mentor,
Samuel Chapman Armstrong, used a model of missionary education in Hawaii
for his Hampton Institute in Virginia for educating blacks, founded in the
height of Reconstruction, in 1868. Later, Armstrong also enrolled students from
Cuba and Puerto Rico, though not without numerous discipline problems, and
also Native American students; indeed, Hampton was an important model for
Richard Henry Pratt's Carlisle Indian Institute in Pennsylvania. Some black lead
ers, most notably William S. Scarborough of Wilberforce University, argued that
U.S.-born blacks were uniquely qualified to elevate the backward peoples of the
Orient and Africa. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Education and the Hampton edu
cator T homas Jesse Jones promoted Booker T. Washington's Tuskegee Institute
to the British for their educational efforts in Africa, while Germany recruited
Tuskegee experts to demonstrate advances in cotton cultivation in its African
colonies (Anderson 257, Gatewood 296-297). Jose-Manuel Navarro has described
the influence of the Hampton/Tuskegee model of manual education on reforms
instituted in Puerto Rican schools during the first decade of U.S. control-many
of them supervised by U.S. government officials who had extensive previous
work with the Freedmen's Bureau after the Civil War.
With the rise of poststructuralist and postcolonial criticism, the careers of
Samuel Chapman Armstrong and Booker T. Washington have received renewed
attention. Two notable examples are Robert Engs's biography of the former and
Houston Baker's meditation on the latter. Baker stresses the Foucauldian aspects
of Washington's Tuskegee as a modernized plantation for the control, not the
freeing, of black labor. Armstrong's life, as discussed by Engs, unforgettably dem
onstrates ties between the reformist agendas of Reconstruction, Christian mis
sionary efforts, and emergent U.S. colonial policies. Samuel Armstrong's father,
Richard, was a Baptist missionary in Hawaii, where Samuel spent his boyhood,
and he passed on to his son a devotion to making people of the colored races
respectable through educational methods that built character by teaching the
manual skills necessary for farming and other trades. But, as Engs points out, few
natives became independent farmers in the mid-nineteenth century after such
schooling; increasingly, Hawaiian land was owned by the families of European
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and U.S. missionaries and businessmen, who established cattle ranches and sugar
cane and pineapple plantations. The efforts of Richard Armstrong, "no matter
how well intended, were not so much training the indigenous population for
self-sufficiency as preparing them for labor on white-owned lands" (Engs 21).
Other schools sprang up in Hawaii that were run on the Armstrong model, such
as Uldrick Thompson's Kamehai»eha School for Girls and Boys (discussed in
the introduction), which trained its students for non-plantation labor. But these
schools, too, focused on job training, not liberal arts instruction.
Richard Armstrong's son Samuel went to Williams College, fought at Gettysburg,
led a Negro regiment, and tlien was a Freedmen's Bureau agent stationed at
Hampton,Virginia. As early as 1866, he began appealing to northefn. philanthro
pists to support his vision of black education, described in his essay "Lessons
from the Hawaiian Islands" as follows: "deficiency of character is the chief dif
ficulty[;) ... to build up character is the true objective point of education, ...
largely on a routine of industrious habit" (Engs 74). This educational model
became the keystone for the Hampton Institute.
Experiments in a "practical" rather tlian liberal arts education for blacks began
in the eighteentli century with Thomas Jefferson and were a feature of several
schemes proposed by abolitionists and others in the antebellum years. But in tlie
nineteenth century tlie most influential version of this educational ideology was tlie
so-called Hampton/Tuskegee model, a joint product of Colonel Samuel Chapman
Armstrong at Hampton and his one-time pupil Booker T.Washington in Tuskegee,
Alabama. Called "industrial" education to give this educational metliod tlie cache
of modernity, tliis approach trained blacks for only a limited number of profes
sions, and many were hardly what we would call industrial.Its agricultural course
sequence followed tlie Hawaiian model most closely, stressing "farming and market
gardening" skills. Other course sequences were commercial (bookkeeping, business
letters and contracts, some commercial law) and mechanical (sewing machines,
penmanship, drawing, printing). Canning and meat-packing and sawmill skills
were taught, to be sure--in fact, Hampton's financial agent opened a meat-packing
and canning factory on the institute's grounds in 1879, using cheap student labor.
Most of the skills taught at Hampton, however, could properly be called pre
industrial, such as farming, blacksmitliing, and shoe-making, plus classes in how to
wait tables and wash dishes for tlie men and, for tlie women, sewing, clotlies repair,
gardening, and cooking, but not stenography or typing. Furtlier, enrolled students
repeatedly protested that their classes did not accomplish tlieir goals.The carpentry
classes at Hampton, for instance, may have focused on building window frames,
not whole houses (Anderson 59-60). And tlie school's vision of social change did
not address tlie question of what carpenters or oilier construction workers would
be allowed to build after tliey graduated, or whetlier they could open independent
businesses and become self-employed "free" labor.
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Training teachers was emphasized as much as any other work. As a promo
tional pamphlet for Hampton assembled by Helen Ludlow proclaimed, "Since
1868, the school's graduates have taught more than 150,000 children in eighteen
states in the South and West" (last page, unnumbered). Although Ludlow boasted
vaguely that "almost every one" of Hampton's graduates became land-buyers (n),
those who know the Jim Crow South may be more skeptical.'5 What Ludlow's
statistics do reveal is that dropouts (called "ex-students") far outnumbered grad
uates: over 5,000 versus 1,101 (last page). If the Hampton/Tuskegee model can
indeed be properly called industrial, it is only because of its machine-like effi
ciency in generating donor money and good publicity.16
As James D. Anderson convincingly has demonstrated, ex-slaves wanted train
ing and employment opportunities in all practical professions. At the same time,
though, resistance to such a narrowly industrial or vocational model of education
was consistent, as measured by the broad spectrum of black community opin
ion; many wanted the stronger presence of a liberal arts curriculum as an option,
funds to support an extensive and modern public school system (not just select
privately run schools like Hampton), and educational results that would increase
social mobility and black community prosperity rather than legitimizing stratifi
cation. True, most students at Hampton took some courses in English, with par
ticular emphasis on spelling, grammar, composition, and elocution; geography;
mathematics; history (English and American, but also "Universal History"); some
classes also in natural science; and the "leading principles of mental and moral
science, and of political economy" (Engs 78; see also 104-105). So the basics for a
liberal arts curriculum were in place. But these proto-liberal arts courses received
much less emphasis than vocational training at Hampton.
Even though some of the privately funded colleges, universities, and Normal
(teacher-training) schools had stronger versions of a liberal arts curriculum,
schools following the Hampton/Tuskegee model were consistently the best funded
in the 1890-1920 period, often receiving considerable support from both white
religious organizations and white businessmen. Northern religious support for
the freed slaves and their children tended by the late 1870s to focus increasingly
on a few select black colleges, unlike the interest in primary and secondary educa
tion immediately after the Civil War-thus in effect leaving black communities to
fend for themselves to educate their children. Northern philanthropic intervention
financially supporting select, high-status black schools in the South like Hampton
and Tuskegee must be understood as a response to the subversion of other means
through public policy for funding a well-organized, universal school system with
a diverse curriculum for blacks. A limited number of grades and a focus prima
rily on practical education were assumed by the vast majority of whites in debates
about black education well into the 193os.17
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Because the Hampton Institute was seen as a valuable generator of trained hands
to meet job needs in those parts of the economy deemed appropriate for blacks,
Armstrong's institution received land grants from the white power structure in
the state, and as it grew its dominant center building remained a rehabilitated
and refurbished "Big House" from a former plantation. In the end, Armstrong
and Washington may have promoted their work as creating self-employed entre
preneurs and citizens, not dependents, but what they actually produced in their
schools were laborers on spec for demands set by others. Washington's 1895 "Atlanta
Compromise" speech at the Cotton Exposition validated trading away not just
black voting rights but also blacks' ability to choose a liberal arts education-all
in order to create a trained manual worker pool that he said would better allow
southern white employers to compete against cheap immigrant labor in the North
and West and in the new colonies.18

s
As the United States moved into the new century, Armstrong's and Washington's
dependency model for black education was chosen to guide official U.S. colonial
educational policies in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. These policies preached
the creation of a self-sufficient citizenry through "Americanization;' yet produced
graduates trained to match the caste divisions and labor needs of the new colo
nial societies. The fullest study documenting the influence of the industrial edu
cation model on U.S. colonial policy makers is Jose-Manuel Navarro's Creating
Tropical Yankees: Social Science Textbooks and U.S. Ideological Control in Puerto
Rico, 1898-1908. Official government reports by the "Porto Rico" and Philippine
Commissions to President McKinley in 1899 and 1900 were full of paternalist
optimism reminiscent of the heady early days of Reconstruction.19 The Puerto
Ricans and Filipinos were seen as recently liberated victims of a decadent and
pre-modern Spanish social system who needed to be taught values of education
and modernity that could only come from the United States. "Put an American
schoolhouse in every valley and upon every hilltop in Porto Rico, and in these
place the well-fitted and accomplished American schoolteachers, and the cloud
of ignorance will disappear as the fog flies before the morning sun" (53; quoted
in Navarro 35). A flock of white American women migrated to the island to teach
in the regular and teacher-training schools, much like the many white north
ern women who went South to teach after the Civil War. Furthermore, those in
charge of colonial educational policy were often key figures in the Civil War and
Reconstruction-such as General John Eaton, who before heading the Bureau
of Education in Puerto Rico had extensive experience as a Union officer, a
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supervisor of seven hundred thousand ex-slaves following the Union armies, and
a Freedmen's Bureau agent organizing schools throughout the Mississippi valley
(Navarro 44-45).
Charles De Garmo's life encapsulated this pattern. A professor of education
at Cornell University, De Garmo issued an educational progress report at the
request of the new president, Theodore Roosevelt, that not only argued for an
industrial education model; it explained precisely how and why such new and
improved Reconstruction policies should be adapted for Puerto Rico:
For a long time after the close of our civil war it was thought that all we
needed to do to make the former slaves self-respecting, self-supporting,
and self-governing was to train their minds in the same way that the sons
of ministers and college professors were trained in the North. The idea
did not occur to us that Latin would not have the same transforming
influence upon the mind of the black men.... It is only now, after some
thirty or more years of experiment, that we are fitting our education to
the social and economic needs of these people, and it is a striking fact
that the best type of education to-day is found in the colored and Indian
schools for industrial training.... Porto Rico is in a position to profit by
this long and extensive experimentation in the United States. (Report of the
Commissioner of Education, 1903; cited in Navarro 73-74)
A better example could probably not be found of how a revisionary and selective
history of Reconstruction grounded post-1898 U.S. colonial policies, especially
when education was concerned. Notable underneath De Garmo's pseudo-scientific
language and smooth complacency is his assumption that pragmatism involves rec
ognizing mental differences caused by race, not just "social and economic needs." As
in much of the rhetoric associated with both Reconstruction and Progressivism, De
Garmo preaches the social construction of economic and civic independence while
signaling that these will be trumped by racial limitations requiring dependency
and supervision, training for the manual labor needs of the new U.S.-dominated
colonial economy.
Despite the lofty discourse about building an island-wide public school sys
tem that would "Americanize" Puerto Ricans and open the doors of opportunity
to those with a strong work ethic, the statistics tell another tale. In 1902 and 1903,
there were 427 public common schools with eight grades in Puerto Rican towns,
but these were only 25 percent of the total in these areas, and in the country
side 75 percent of the schools had no more than three grades (Navarro 72-73).
Admittedly, this fledgling school system in Puerto Rico-unlike that in the
post-Reconstruction South-was seen as a federal as well as local responsibility.
What had been deemed inappropriate for U.S. blacks was now validated for
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new colonial subjects as official U.S. government policy. Historians have con
cluded that the new education system in Puerto Rico largely reinforced rather
than challenged local employment patterns, caste divisions, and poverty, though
some individual graduates certainly were unprecedented success stories. Its
effects thus paralleled those of new schools for children of color in Hawaii and
in the U.S. South, though the Puerto Rican system was federally mandated and
maintained.20
Let us now turn to works of imaginative literature to see how such works
might test this chapter's thesis that Reconstruction's dependency model for black
education morphed with the rise of Jim Crow colonialism into new forms of
uplift-bondage and perpetual sitting in darkness. We will find that interpreting
the phrase "the consent of the governed" proves a more complicated and mor
ally ambiguous task than Senator Orville Platt or Frankling Giddings assumed.
Writers such as Albion Tourgee or Sutton Griggs or Frances Harper or George
Marion McClellan would certainly not have been surprised at De Garmo's revi
sionist reading of the meaning of Reconstruction; they would have recognized it
as part of an emerging national, not just white Southern, consensus-one that
also elevated Booker T. Washington to being the sole black voice with national
authority to speak about the educational needs of blacks. Nor would those writ
ers discussed in part 1 have been deaf to a certain degree of unintended irony in
the quotation with which this chapter began, Charles Denby's "Gentlemen of the
South, gentlemen of Dixie-some of us imperialists do not blame you at all for
taking all possible legal measures to protect your cherished rights. Will you not
forgive us, if we pursue the same policy with regard to a new and untried race?
...To say that we want to enslave these people [in the new colonies] is a slander.
To say that we shall not improve their condition is to contradict history" ("What
Shall We Do" 50-51). For sometimes history presents its own contradictions to
those like Denby or De Garmo who would presume to speak for it.
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